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Introduction
1 The number of municipal councillors in the 19 municipalities of Brussels is increasing.
Today  – after  the  2012  elections –  685  councillors  are  in  office.  In  2006,  663  were
appointed  and  in  2000  653.  After  the  municipal  elections  of  2018  the  number  of
councillors  will  amount  to  693.  The  total  number  of  aldermen is  also  following this
upward trend, increasing from 132 aldermen in 2000 to 141 aldermen in 2018.  Those
numbers just evolve according to the population size. In Brussels, the exact same rules
apply as in Flanders and Wallonia. But because the municipalities of the Brussels-Capital
Region  are  all  medium-sized  to  very  large,  and  because  the  population  size  of  all
municipalities is increasing, the number of municipal councillors and aldermen is high
and continues to increase.
2 In the Brussels-Capital Region, both the status of the municipalities (the powers they can
exercise) and the number of municipalities have been the object of debate for a very long
time now [Rowies, 1980; Witte et al., 2003; Vaesen, 2008]. Most of the time, Dutch speaking
and  French  speaking  parties  take  different  positions  in  the  matter.  Dutch  speaking
parties often call for a limitation on the number of municipalities – even reducing them
to a single one – and so for a strengthening of the regional institutions. These are also the
institutions  where  a  Dutch  speaking  presence  in  the  council  is  the  largest.  French
speaking parties defend the existing situation, with arguments that refer to the proximity
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of the municipal level for the citizens, and also to the institutional compromise which, in
exchange  for  a  strong  protection  of  the  Dutch  speaking  minority  in  the  Region,
maintained the municipalities as a political level. The fear for a blocking of the regional
institutions by the right of veto for the Dutch speaking representatives is another reason
to maintain the municipalities as a fully-fledged level of decision-making [Nassaux, 2018].
3 In 2017, Rudi Vervoort, Minister-President of the Brussels-Capital Region, suggested to
reduce the number of municipal councillors and aldermen in Brussels within the existing
institutional  framework (without  modifying the number of  municipalities  or  to  their
powers).  This  would  address  the  criticism  that  in  Brussels  for  a  relatively  limited
population and for a relatively small area there would be more representatives than in
the  two  other  regions  and  than  in  other  cities.  A  comparison of  the  number  of
representatives in Brussels with other cities at home and abroad, and also with cities
which are both capital and region in a Federation (such as Vienna and Berlin), indeed
shows  that  the  number  of  Brussels’  representatives  -  especially  the  executive
representatives - is relatively high [Bürger, 2013; Martin, 2013; van Haute, Deschouwer,
et al. 2018]. 
4 However, reducing the number of representatives is much more than just a mathematical
process. The number of available seats at the elections has a direct impact on, among
other things, the number of seats that can be conquered for each list, and thus for the
composition of the lists, for the opportunity for specific groups to be elected and for the
way in which representatives can exercise their function [e.g.  Pilet,  Freire and Costa,
2012]. In this contribution we want to examine the potential impact of a reduction in the
number  of  municipal  councillors  and  aldermen  in  the  Brussels-Capital  Region.  We
examine three scenarios: a reduction in the number of councillors and aldermen with 10,
20 and 30 %. These are obviously arbitrary percentages, but they allow us to figure out
how the effects of a reduction in the number of representatives get more tangible as that
reduction continues. For each of these scenarios, we look at the potential impact on the
ideological  diversity,  on the workload,  on the formation of  coalitions,  on the gender
balances and on the position of the Dutch speaking elected representatives. It shows that
a reduction in the number of councillors and aldermen would not be a politically neutral
process. The smaller political groups would be affected, and it would also decrease the
number of Dutch speaking representatives. And it is expected that decreasing the number
of councillors in the BCR can also affect the gender balances. 
5 Thus,  we  also  show that  the  Brussels  context  makes  it  very  difficult  to  look  at  the
institutions, the rules and the procedures separately, and to believe that they could be or
become the product of a neutral and objective endeavour. The Brussels institutions are
the result of a subtle and complex compromise, and a delicate interconnected framework.
The most recent illustration of it is the attempt to limit the cumulation of mandates on
the municipal and regional level. It led to differences between French speakers and Dutch
speakers and to a conflict of interest that was invoked by the Flemish Parliament. So a
“simple” reduction of the number of councillors or aldermen is not likely to be an easy
task. 
 
1. The number of representatives
6 The number of municipal councillors and aldermen which a municipality is entitled to
have is determined by the New Municipal Law (NLC)1. This Law connects the number of
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municipal councillors to the population of a municipality. The larger a municipality, the
more representatives it has, and that applies to both the councillors and the aldermen
(see  table 1).  The  three  Belgian regions  apply  the  same rules,  and also  in  the  other
regions, the number of councillors and aldermen is steadily increasing. From 2019 on,
each municipality in Flanders will have one less alderman, but the CPAS-President will be
ex officio member of the Council of Mayor and aldermen. 
 
Table 1. The current rules regarding the number of councillors and aldermen
Population Number of councillors Number of aldermen
< 1 000 7 2
1 000 – 1 999 9 3
2 000 – 2 999 11 3
3 000 – 3 999 13 3
4 000 – 4 999 15 3
5 000 – 6 999 17 4
7 000 – 8 999 19 4
9 000 – 9 999 21 4
10 000 – 11 999 21 5
12 000 – 14 999 23 5
15 000 – 19 999 25 5
20 000 – 24 999 27 6
25 000 – 39 999 29 6
30 000 – 34 999 31 7
35 000 – 39 999 33 7
40 000 – 49 999 35 7
50 000 – 59 999 37 8
60 000 – 69 999 39 8
70 000 – 79 999 41 8
80 000 – 89 999 43 8
90 000 – 99 999 45 8
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100 000 – 149 999 47 9
150 000 – 199 999 49 9
200 000 – 249 999 51 10
250 000 – 299 999 53 10
> 300 000 55 10
Source: articles 8 and 16 of the NLC
7 Table 2  shows the evolution of  the number of  municipal  councillors  in  the Brussels-
Capital  Region  during  the  past  three  legislatures  (2000-2012)  and  it  also  makes  a
projection  for  the  next  two  legislatures  (2018-2024)2.  Between  2000  and  2012,  five
municipalities  maintained  the  same  number  of  councillors  (Saint-Gilles,  Schaerbeek,
Uccle,  Watermael-Boitsfort and Woluwe-Saint-Pierre),  two had four more members in
their councils (Anderlecht and Molenbeek-Saint-Jean) and all of the other municipalities
increased their number of councillors with two. All in all the number of councillors has
increased by 5 %. The projections show that if the regulations remain the same there will
be eight additional councillors in 2018 (based on the population size on 1 January 2017)
and another 12 in 2024 (according to the population projections by the Brussels Institute
for Statistics and Analysis IBSA [2016]).
8 All in all, the number of councillors will increase with 52 between 2000 and 2025 (or an
increase of 8 %), spread as follows: 
• No increase in two municipalities: Schaerbeek and Watermael-Boitsfort
• Two additional  councillors  in  9 municipalities:  Auderghem,  Forest,  Ixelles,  Koekelberg,
Saint-Gilles, Saint-Josse-Ten-Noode, Uccle, Woluwe-Saint-Lambert and Woluwe-Saint-Pierre
• Four additional  councillors  in  7 municipalities:  Anderlecht,  Berchem-Sainte-Agatha,
Brussels-City, Etterbeek, Evere, Ganshoren and Jette.
• Six additional councillors in Molenbeek-Saint-Jean.
9 The number of aldermen is established by article 16 of the NLC. However, under certain
conditions, as stated in article 279 of the NLC, the number of aldermen can be increased
by one in the Brussels-Capital Region. That is the mechanism of the additional alderman.
On the municipal level in Brussels there is no guarantee for the participation of Dutch
speaking elected representatives in the Council, such as it exists in the Region. However,
since  2001  the  Lombard Agreements  provide  for  a  financial  reward  if  municipalities
include a Dutch-speaking representative in the Council of aldermen or if they appoint a
Dutch-speaking representative as President of the CPAS. We did not add these additional
aldermen in our calculations.  After all,  they are the result  of  agreements during the
formation of the coalitions in the municipalities, and therefore their number fluctuates
according to the decisions per municipality as to whether or not to make use of the
mechanism of the additional alderman. That does not mean, however, that in the debate
on the  number  of  municipal  councillors  these  additional  aldermen are  unimportant.
Quite the contrary:  as  the demand for a reduction of  the complexity of  the Brussels
institutions often comes from Dutch speakers, the answer of the French speakers is that
precisely that part of that complexity contributes to the protection of the Dutch speaking
minority, both in the municipalities as in the regional institutions. So we simulate a linear
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reduction  of  the  number  of  aldermen  without  the  additional  aldermen,  but  in  the
discussion on the effects we do point out the consequences on the possibility to continue
applying the mechanism of additional aldermen. 
10 Table  3  presents  the  evolution  of  the  number  of  aldermen  during  the  last  three
legislations and a projection for the next two legislations. Between 2000 and 2012, the
number  of  aldermen  increased  with  one  in  seven  councils.  So  the  total  number  of
aldermen in the Region increased from 132 in 2000 to 139 in 2012 (+ 5 %).
 
Table 2. Evolution of the number of municipal councillors
Source: [IBSA, 2016], own calculations
 
Table 3. Evolution of the number of aldermen
Municipality 2000-2006 2006-2012 2012-2018
Projection
2018
Projection
2025
Anderlecht 8 8 9 9 9
Auderghem 6 6 7 7 7
Berchem-Sainte-
Agathe
5 6 6 6 6
Brussels 9 9 9 9 10
Etterbeek 7 7 7 7 8
Evere 7 7 7 7 7
Forest 7 7 8 8 8
Ganshoren 5 6 6 6 6
Ixelles 8 8 8 8 8
Jette 7 7 7 8 8
Koekelberg 5 5 6 6 6
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Molenbeek-Saint-Jean 8 8 8 8 9
Saint-Gilles 7 7 7 8 8
Saint-Josse-Ten-Noode 6 6 6 6 6
Schaerbeek 9 9 9 9 9
Uccle 8 8 8 8 8
Watermael-Boitsfort 6 6 6 6 6
Woluwe-Saint-Lambert 7 7 8 8 8
Woluwe-Saint-Pierre 7 7 7 7 7
TOTAL 132 134 139 141 144
Source: [IBSA, 2016], own calculations
11 At  unmodified  regulations  the  projection  shows  that  there  will  be  two  additional
aldermen in 20183 (based on the population size on 1 January 2017)  and again three
additional aldermen in 2024. All in all there would be twelve additional aldermen between
2000 and 2024 (+ 9 %).  To these numbers the Dutch additional aldermen must also be
added. 
12 The  Brussels-Capital  Region  is  fully  responsible  for  the  regulation  of  the  local
administrations. Therefore the Parliament and the Government can change the articles 9
and 16 of the NLC by means of an ordinance. But that ordinance will have to be approved
with a double majority – a majority in each language group. 
13 We have tested three possible scenarios: a reduction in the number of councillors with
30 %,  20 %  and  10 %.  Every  time  a  linear  reduction  was  applied  in  each  of  the
19 municipalities.  Table 4  presents  the  number  of  councillors  for  each  municipality
according to each of these three scenarios.
 
Table 4. Size of the municipal councils according to the three reduction scenarios 
Municipality Number of councillors 2012-18 - 30 % - 20 % - 10 %
Anderlecht 47 33 38 42
Auderghem 31 22 25 28
Berchem-Sainte-Agathe 27 19 22 24
Brussels 49 34 39 44
Etterbeek 35 24 28 31
Evere 33 23 26 30
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Forest 37 26 30 33
Ganshoren 27 19 22 24
Ixelles 43 30 34 38
Jette 35 24 28 31
Koekelberg 27 19 22 24
Molenbeek-Saint-Jean 45 31 36 40
Saint-Gilles 35 24 28 31
Saint-Josse-Ten-Noode 29 20 23 26
Schaerbeek 47 33 38 42
Uccle 41 29 33 37
Watermael-Boitsfort 27 19 22 24
Woluwe-Saint-Lambert 37 26 30 33
Woluwe-Saint-Pierre 33 23 26 30
TOTAL 685 478 550 612
14 The most drastic scenario (reduction of 30 %) would reduce the number of municipal
councillors in the region with more than 200 (from 685 to 478). A linear 20 % reduction
leads to a reduction of 135 municipal councillors and a reduction by 10 % would reduce
the number of councillors with 73. 
15 These scenarios are of course not the only imaginable. Both smaller and larger reductions
can be considered. Article 8 of the NLC stipulates a minimum of 7 councillors for the
smallest municipalities (less than 1 000 inhabitants). At a reduction of 30 %, the smallest
municipal councils in the BCR would have only 19 members, i.e. the number of councillors
stipulated by the NLC for municipalities with between 7 000 and 8 999 inhabitants. The
smallest  municipality in Brussels  (Koekelberg –  see table 2),  however,  has  more than
16 000 inhabitants. 
16 The question can also be asked whether one should stick to the principle that municipal
councils should have an odd number of members. Today, this is still the case. It allows to
avoid political deadlock when a municipal council is divided into two equal camps. In the
case of a linear reduction of the number of councillors, the result must then be corrected
if it is an even number. 
17 Another question concerns the evolution of the size of the municipal councils in function
of  the population size,  as  it  is  now stipulated in the NLC (see above).  Although that
mechanism stipulates a maximum number of municipal  councillors for municipalities
with more than 300 000 inhabitants, it evidently does not stipulate a maximum number
for  the  whole  of  the  BCR.  In  other  words,  if  the  population  of  the  BCR  and  its
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municipalities continues to increase, the total number of municipal councillors in the
region will also continue to increase.
18 A possible solution is to apply the same logic as for the determination of the number of
seats of the Federal Chamber or of the Walloon and Flemish Parliament. The total number
of  elected representatives  is  fixed – 150 for  the  Chamber –  and that  number is  then
distributed between the different constituencies according to their population size. If this
rule  is  applied  to  the  municipal  councillors,  the  BCR  could  set  a  total  number  of
councillors.  That would be a absolute maximum. Evolutions in the population size by
municipality would only lead to an adjustment of the distribution of seats between the
municipalities. In such a scenario it would not be appropriate to simply distribute the
total number of councillors over the municipalities. This would strongly disadvantage the
smaller municipalities. Better is to develop a method that sets a number of councillors for
the whole BCR, a fixed number by municipality (for example, 50 % of the total) and then a
variable part that would be distributed over the municipalities according to the number
of  inhabitants.  For  the  variable  part  each  municipality  would  receive  a  number  of
councillors that corresponds to the weight of the population of the municipality in the
total population of the BCR, just like it is the case in the Chamber. 
19 One could also possibly determine a minimum threshold for each municipality. 
 
2. Decrease of the number of municipal councillors:
possible consequences
20 In the following sections, we look at the political consequences of the three scenarios
(30 %, 20 %, 10 %), on the basis of the results of the 2012 municipal elections. We look at
how the votes per list of those elections would be turned into seat distribution, and then
also how the mandates would be distributed within the lists. Other consequences are also
possible, but they cannot be illustrated just on the basis of simulations. A change in the
number of available seats, for example, can affect the way in which parties draft their
lists, or decide whether or not to present a list via cartel formation with other parties
[Verthé and Deschouwer, 2011]. We look only to the effects that can be simulated and
calculated, and know that this is not the full picture. 
 
2.1. The political-ideological diversity 
21 At first we look at the extent to which a reduction in the number of municipal councillors
has implications for the diversity of the political representation. Political research has
elaborately  demonstrated  that  the  proportionality  of  the  seat  distribution  and  the
number of lists that secure at least one single seat is directly related to the number of
mandates to be distributed [Cox, 1997]. The fewer seats there are to distribute, the harder
it is for a small list to gain at least one single seat, and the less really proportional the
distribution of seats can be. 
22 We therefore look at the number of lists that could obtain at least one single seat in the
different municipalities in 2012, and how that number would evolve if the number of
councillors would be reduced with 10, 20 or 30 % (table 5). This first simulation already
shows that none of the three scenarios would have a really big impact on the number of
lists with elected representatives. Even a 30 % reduction would only have a limited effect.
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Today, the average number of lists is 5,4. That would drop to 5,0 with a decrease in the
number of councillors by 30 %, and to 5,2 with a reduction by 10 or 20 %. If we check
municipality by municipality, we see that in 13 of the 19 municipalities, none of the three
scenarios would lead to a decrease in the number of lists with at least one single elected
representative. 
23 There would be a loss of the only seat of Vlaams Belang in Anderlecht, of the list SAMEN
in Auderghem, of the FDF list in Ganshoren (- 30 %), of the N-VA list in Jette, of the lists of
FDF and ISLAM in Molenbeek (only at - 30 %) and of the PTB-PvdA list in Schaerbeek. The
number of lists is evidently limited, but it has to be noted that those lists are lists which
do not participate in the elections in collaboration with other lists (or cartels), and that
the unilingual Dutch speaking lists would be particularly affected (see also below). 
 
Table 5. The number of lists with at least one single seat in the municipal councils in 2012 and
projections 
Municipality
Number of lists with at least one single seat
in 2012
- 30 % - 20 % - 10 %
Anderlecht 6 5 5 5
Auderghem 5 4 4 4
Berchem-Sainte-
Agathe
7 7 7 7
Brussels 6 6 6 6
Etterbeek 5 5 5 5
Evere 5 5 5 5
Forest 5 5 5 5
Ganshoren 5 4 5 5
Ixelles 5 5 5 5
Jette 7 6 6 6
Koekelberg 3 3 3 3
Molenbeek-Saint-Jean 8 6 8 8
Saint-Gilles 4 4 4 4
Saint-Josse-Ten-
Noode
4 4 4 4
Schaerbeek 6 5 5 5
Uccle 5 5 5 5
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Watermael-Boitsfort 5 5 5 5
Woluwe-Saint-
Lambert
5 5 5 5
Woluwe-Saint-Pierre 6 6 6 6
TOTAL 5,4 5,0 5,2 5,2
24 As for the access to the municipal council for smaller lists, it can be pointed out that their
loss could be largely compensated if the system Imperiali for the distribution of seats was
used instead of the current D'Hondt system. The first is now used for municipal elections,
the  other  for  European,  Federal  and  regional  elections4.  The  Imperiali  system
unmistakably favours the larger lists. By switching to the D’Hondt system, the number of
lists with at least one elected representative would remain very close to the current
situation, even with a reduction by 30 %. In replacing the Imperiali system by the D’Hondt
system,  we  have  been  able  to  calculate  that  all  the  lists  that  would  lose  their
representative after the reduction of the number of councillors would actually retain
him. 
 
2.2. The workload
25 The number of lists that are represented in the municipal council is not the only aspect to
be  looked  at.  We  must  also  check  if  the  political  workload  is  acceptable  in  smaller
communal  councils  (and small  colleges  of  aldermen).  For  the municipal  councils,  we
consider two elements: the average number of elected representatives per list and the
margin of the majority controlled by the parties which, in 2012, decided to govern a
municipality together. 
26 The first criterion – the number of elected representatives per list – is important for the
work  that  has  to  be  done  in  the  municipal  councils.  Many  and  different  issues  are
discussed during a session of the municipal council. That implies a certain distribution of
responsibilities  between  the  municipal  councillors,  in  particular  within  the  political
groups  in  the  council.  For  lists  with a  small  number  of  elected representatives  it  is
difficult, not to say impossible, to follow all those dossiers in detail. The quality control of
the local government by the council would thus be directly affected. 
27 When  the  total  number  of  municipal  councillors  is  reduced,  the  number  of  elected
representatives per list also decreases (table 6). In that case, the impact of the reduction
in the number of councillors is very clear. Especially a decrease of 30 % would lead to a
significant reduction of the size of the political groups. The average number of elected
members per group would drop from 5,8 to 4,0. In some municipalities the drop is even
more substantial. In Anderlecht, Auderghem, Schaerbeek or Uccle the average number of
elected members per list would not exceed 3. That is due to the fact that often many votes
go to one big list and/or that the votes are spread over a large number of small lists. 
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Table 6. The average number of elected representatives per list in 2012 and projections 
Municipality
Average  number  of  elected  representatives
per list in 2012
- 30 % - 20 % - 10 %
Anderlecht 4,3 3,0 3,4 3,8
Auderghem 2,8 2,0 2,3 2,5
Berchem-Sainte-
Agathe
4,9 3,4 4,0 4,4
Brussels 8,9 6,2 7,1 8,0
Etterbeek 6,4 4,4 5,1 5,6
Evere 6,0 4,2 4,7 5,4
Forest 6,7 4,7 5,4 6,0
Ganshoren 4,9 3,4 4,0 4,4
Ixelles 7,8 5,4 6,2 6,9
Jette 6,4 4,4 5,1 5,6
Koekelberg 4,9 3,4 4,0 4,4
Molenbeek-Saint-
Jean
8,2 5,6 6,5 7,3
Saint-Gilles 6,4 4,4 5,1 5,6
Saint-Josse-Ten-
Noode
5,3 3,6 4,2 4,7
Schaerbeek 4,3 3,0 3,4 3,8
Uccle 3,7 2,6 3,0 3,4
Watermael-Boitsfort 4,9 3,4 4,0 4,4
Woluwe-Saint-
Lambert
6,7 4,7 5,4 6,0
Woluwe-Saint-Pierre 6,0 4,2 4,7 5,4
TOTAL 5,8 4,0 4,6 5,1
28 Table 7 illustrates the difficulties some groups would experience by representing for each
municipality the number of lists with less than 3 elected representatives, in the current
circumstances  and according to the three scenarios.  In each of  them the number of
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groups with only one or two elected representatives would increase. In the 30 %scenario
that number would increase from 23 to 29, knowing that in addition, a number of lists
that only had a single elected representative in 2012 would lose that representative too
and disappear from the municipal  council.  There is  no doubt that  for  some political
groups,  the  decrease  in  the  number  of  municipal  councillors  would  lead  to  great
difficulties in fulfilling their duties.
 
Table 7. Number of lists with less than 3 elected representatives, 2012 and projections 
Municipality
Number  of  lists  with  less  than  3  elected
representatives in 2012
- 30 % - 20 % - 10 %
Anderlecht 3 2 2 2
Auderghem 3 2 2 2
Berchem-Sainte-
Agathe
3 4 4 3
Brussels 1 2 1 1
Etterbeek 0 1 1 0
Evere 0 2 1 1
Forest 0 2 1 1
Ganshoren 2 1 2 2
Ixelles 0 1 0 0
Jette 3 2 2 2
Koekelberg 0 1 1 1
Molenbeek-Saint-
Jean
3 1 3 3
Saint-Gilles 1 1 1 1
Saint-Josse-Ten-
Noode
0 1 1 0
Schaerbeek 0 0 0 0
Uccle 0 1 1 1
Watermael-
Boitsfort
1 1 1 1
Woluwe-Saint-
Lambert
1 3 2 1
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Woluwe-Saint-
Pierre
2 1 1 2
TOTAL 23 29 27 24
29 The interviews and focus groups5 we organized with local representatives in 2013 and
2017 confirm this fear.  Municipal  councillors point out that one of the difficulties to
properly fulfill their mandate is a lack of time caused by the time spent in preparing the
dossiers, the travelling, the meetings of the council and of the committees and – for some
also – caused by the absence of logistical or technical support for the exercise of their
democratic control. That lack of time is more acute for the smaller groups, the political
groups  in  the  opposition  and  the  municipal  councillors  who  are  no  professional
politicians (and thus exercise another profession) or are “ultra-professional” and have
different mandates at the same time6. A reduction in the number of councillors will no
doubt make this problem even more acute.
30 In this context, we must also point out that sometimes the recruitment of political staff is
very difficult at the local level [Devos, Reynaert and Verlet, 2008]. The lack of time to
properly fulfill a mandate was mentioned by various group leaders as being one of the
major obstacles to convince people to be a candidate for the elections. If a reduction in
the number of councillors can slightly mitigate the problem of recruitment by itself, a
concentration of the political work will certainly result in a greater professionalization of
the local political mandates, and will certainly also change the profile of the candidates
on the lists for the municipal elections [Delwit 2006]. A larger number of councillors,
however, can also allow a wider range of opinions, backgrounds and neighbourhoods to
be  represented  in  the  municipal  councils.  In  conversations  we  had  with  30 local
representatives in 2018 (especially Mayors and aldermen) this argument of diversity was
very often used to argue against a reduction of the number of councillors. 
 
2.3. The governing majorities
31 Another  consequence  of  the  reduction  of  the  number  of  mandates  that  must  be
investigated, is that of the formation of governing majorities. Two questions arise in this
respect. The first is whether the majority that was formed in 2012 could also be formed
after a reduction in the number of councillors. And – secondly – would there be more
parties needed to form a majority? Both elements are analysed in the simulations in the
tables 8 and 9. 
32 Table 8 lists for each municipality the percentage of seats controlled by the governing
majority that was formed in 2012, and the percentage of seats that they would have after
the linear  reduction of  the number of  councillors  with 10,  20  or  30 %.  In general,  a
decrease in the number of councillors strengthens the governing majority. Yet the shifts
are not very important. A 30 % reduction in the size of the councils leads to an increase of
only 1 percentage point. And a reduction in the number of seats with 10 or 20 % produces
a shift of more or less one percentage point. In some municipalities, we also see a very
slight drop in the size of the coalition. That happens in those cases where the lists that
govern the municipality would be most affected by the reduction of the council. That
would be the case in Berchem-Sainte-Agathe, Etterbeek, Ixelles, Saint-Gilles, Saint-Josse-
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Ten-Noode, Schaerbeek and Watermael-Boitsfort.  In none of the 19 municipalities the
majority of 2012 would be lost by reducing the number of representatives.
 
Table 8. Percentage of seats controlled by the majorities in the municipalities, in 2012 and
projections 
Municipality % of seats in the majority in 2012 - 30 % - 20 % - 10 %
Anderlecht 74,5 78,8 76,3 76,22
Auderghem 74,2 77,3 76,0 75,0
Berchem-Sainte-Agathe 59,3 57,9 63,6 62,5
Brussels 57,1 58,8 56,4 56,8
Etterbeek 80,0 79,2 82,1 77,4
Evere 60,6 60,9 61,5 60,0
Forest 64,9 65,4 66,7 63,6
Ganshoren 63,0 68,4 68,2 62,5
Ixelles 53,5 53,3 52,9 52,6
Jette 60,0 62,5 60,7 61,3
Koekelberg 59,3 63,2 63,6 62,5
Molenbeek-Saint-Jean 55,6 58,1 52,8 52,5
Saint-Gilles 71,4 70,8 67,9 71,0
Saint-Josse-Ten-Noode 72,4 70,0 73,9 69,2
Schaerbeek 61,7 60,6 60,5 61,9
Uccle 70,7 72,4 72,7 73,0
Watermael-Boitsfort 55,6 52,6 59,1 54,2
Woluwe-Saint-Lambert 73,0 73,1 73,3 72,7
Woluwe-Saint-Pierre 54,5 56,5 57,7 53,3
TOTAL 64,3 65,3 65,6 64,1
33 In table 9, that same weak impact of a decrease in the number of representatives on the
formation and the stability of the governing majorities is also evident. In that table we
look at the number of parties that are at least required to form a majority (to form a so-
called “minimal winning coalition”) in each municipality. That number is almost nowhere
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influenced by our scenarios, except in one municipality where in the scenario of the 30 %
drop, the largest list (the Mayor’s list) would have acquired an absolute majority of the
seats. 
 
Table 9. Number of parties necessary to form a minimal winning coalition, in 2012 and projections 
Municipality
Minimum  number  of  parties  to  form  a
coalition
- 30 % - 20 % - 10 %
Anderlecht 2 2 2 2
Auderghem 1 1 1 1
Berchem-Sainte-
Agathe
2 2 2 2
Brussels 2 2 2 2
Etterbeek 2 2 2 2
Evere 2 1 2 2
Forest 2 2 2 2
Ganshoren 2 2 2 2
Ixelles 2 2 2 2
Jette 2 2 2 2
Koekelberg 1 1 1 1
Molenbeek-Saint-Jean 2 2 2 2
Saint-Gilles 1 1 1 1
Saint-Josse-Ten-Noode 1 1 1 1
Schaerbeek 2 2 2 2
Uccle 1 1 1 1
Watermael-Boitsfort 2 2 2 2
Woluwe-Saint-
Lambert
1 1 1 1
Woluwe-Saint-Pierre 2 2 2 2
TOTAL 1,7 1,6 1,7 1,7
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2.4. The Dutch speaking elected representatives
34 Any drop in the number of municipal councillors would not only have an impact on the
distribution of seats between the lists. It would also have effects on the distribution of
seats within the lists. We focus in particular on the effects of a reduction in the number of
councillors on the proportion of elected female candidates and on the opportunities for
the Dutch speaking candidates. The projections we make are based on the results of the
elections in 2012, not on further developments within the lists and in the councils. Again
we do not present a neat and complete picture of all possible consequences of a drop in
the number of representatives. For example, in the Brussels context it is very relevant to
know the extent to which the composition of the lists may have an impact on the voting
behaviour of voters with a migration background and for the chances of candidates with a
migration background to be elected [Jacobs, 2010]. That is not independent of the extent
to which non-Belgian voters register for the local elections [Nikolic, 2017]. And the exact
identification of candidates with a migration background is also very difficult [Jacobs,
2009]. For the female and the Dutch-speaking elected representatives on the other hand,
it is rather easy to simulate the effects of a reduction in the number of representatives
and aldermen. 
35 Table 10 allows you to evaluate the impact of a reduction in the number of mandates on
the  absolute  number  and  on  the  proportion  of  elected  Dutch  speakers  in  the
municipalities of Brussels7. The most important lesson we can draw from it, is that the
proportion of Dutch speaking elected representatives in the BCR would be hard hit by
such a reduction in the number of  mandates.  A reduction of  10 % of  the number of
councillors,  would reduce the number of  Dutch speakers  by almost  15 % (- 9  elected
representatives out of a total of 69, or 13,3 %). A reduction of 30 % of the number of
councillors would reduce the number of Dutch speakers by 37.7 %.
36 That  general  trend  hides  large  differences  between  the  municipalities.  In  those
municipalities,  where  the  share  of  the  Dutch  speaking  elected  representatives  was
already limited in 2012, a reduction in the number of mandates can really have a big
impact. For example, a 30 % reduction would result in the complete disappearance of
Dutch speaking representatives in three municipalities (Auderghem, Forest and Ixelles).
They would lose  the possibility  of  adding an additional  Dutch speaking alderman to
reflect the bilingual character of the BCR. In addition, there would be only one Dutch
speaking representative in six municipalities (Saint-Gilles, Saint-Josse-Ten-Noode, Uccle,
Watermael-Boitsfort,  Woluwe-Saint-Lambert  and Woluwe-Saint-Pierre).  If  that  elected
representative is not a member of the majority, those municipalities would not appoint
any additional Dutch speaking alderman. 
 
Table 10. Number and proportion of the Dutch speaking elected representatives, 2012 and
projections 
Municipality
Numbers  and  proportion  in
2012
- 30 % - 20 % - 10 %
 N % N % N % N %
Anderlecht 11 23,4 7 21,2 8 21,1 8 19,1
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Auderghem 1 3,2 0 0,0 0 0,00 0 0,00
Berchem-Sainte-Agathe 5 18,5 3 15,8 4 18,2 5 20,8
Brussels 10 20,4 8 23,5 10 25,6 10 22,7
Etterbeek 3 8,6 3 12,5 3 10,7 3 9,7
Evere 3 9,1 3 13,0 3 11,5 3 10,0
Forest 0 0,00 0 0,0 0 0,00 0 0,0
Ganshoren 4 14,8 3 15,8 4 18,2 4 16,7
Ixelles 1 2,3 0 0,0 0 0,00 1 2,6
Jette 6 17,1 3 12,5 5 17,9 5 16,1
Koekelberg 5 18,5 3 15,8 4 18,2 4 16,7
Molenbeek-Saint-Jean 5 11,1 2 6,4 3 8,3 5 12,5
Saint-Gilles 3 8,6 1 4,2 2 7,1 2 6,5
Saint-Josse-Ten-Noode 2 6,9 1 5,0 2 8,7 2 7,7
Schaerbeek 3 6,4 2 6,1 2 5,3 2 4,8
Uccle 2 4,9 1 3,4 1 3,0 2 5,4
Watermael-Boitsfort 2 7,4 1 5,3 1 4,6 1 4,2
Woluwe-Saint-Lambert 2 5,4 1 3,8 2 6,7 2 6,1
Woluwe-Saint-Pierre 1 3,0 1 4,3 1 3,9 1 3,3
TOTAL 69 10,1 43 9,0 55 10,0 60 9,8
37 This very pernicious effect of a reduction in the number of councillors on the number of
Dutch-speaking elected representatives, especially in municipalities where there already
are  very  few  of  them,  is  caused  by  two  mechanisms.  As  already  indicated,  with  a
reduction  in  the  number  of  mandates,  the  lists  that  had  only  one  single  elected
representative in 2012 – in different municipalities those are the monolingual  Dutch-
speaking lists (N-VA, Vlaams Belang, SAMEN) – are especially vulnerable. On the other
hand, the Dutch-speaking elected representatives on bilingual lists often are those who
obtain  their  seat  with  the  lowest  number  of  preference  votes.  When the  number  of
mandates is reduced, they are the ones who will lose their seat.
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2.5. Gender balances
38 Electoral systems – and the number of seats available are part of it – are never gender
neutral  [Kittilson  and  Schwindt-Bayer,  2012].  However,  Table 11  shows  that  a  linear
reduction in the number of  representatives would not  have a negative effect  on the
number of female elected representatives. Even more so, the projections show that in the
three scenarios the number of female elected representatives would slightly rise in the
municipal councils of the BCR. In 2012, there were 38,83 % female representatives. That
would have been 41,63 % if there were 30 % fewer seats to distribute. It would be 41,27 %
in case of a 20 % drop and 40,69 % in case of a 10 % drop. This positive effect is present in
all  municipalities,  except  in  Berchem-Sainte-Agathe  and  – for  some  scenarios –  in
Brussels-City,  Etterbeek and Jette.  Finally,  we note that  a decrease in the number of
representatives by 30 % would have led to a female majority in four municipal councils
(Auderghem, Ganshoren, Ixelles and Woluwe-Saint-Lambert), whereas this is now only
the case in Auderghem and Ixelles.
39 This  slightly  positive  effect  of  the  reduction  in  the  number  of  mandates  on  the
representation  of  women  is  not  entirely  surprising.  For  municipal  elections,  the
allocation of the list votes to the candidates usually only benefits the first two candidates
on the list. The other candidates will obtain their seat based on their preference votes
only. Research has shown that male candidates generally receive more preference votes
because more male voters only vote for men than female voters only for women [Marien
et al. 2016]. The more mandates there are to distribute, the more that benefit of the male
candidates in terms of  obtained preference votes translates into elected positions.  If,
however, the number of mandates is reduced, preference votes play a smaller role, and
the disadvantage in preference votes for the female candidates does not exist.
 
Table 11. Number and proportion of elected women in the municipal council, 2012 and projections 
Municipality
Elected  in
2012
- 30 % - 20 % - 10 %
 N % N % N % N %
Anderlecht 17 36,2 12 36,4 17 44,7 17 40,5
Auderghem 18 58,1 14 63,6 16 64,0 17 60,7
Berchem-Sainte-Agathe 7 26,0 4 21,0 5 22,7 6 25,0
Brussels 18 36,7 12 35,3 14 35,9 17 38,6
Etterbeek 14 40,0 9 37,5 11 39,3 13 41,9
Evere 12 36,4 9 39,1 10 38,5 12 40,0
Forest 14 37,8 12 46,1 13 43,3 13 39,4
Ganshoren 13 48,1 10 52,6 11 50,0 13 54,2
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Ixelles 24 55,8 18 60,0 19 55,9 21 55,3
Jette 14 40,0 9 37,5 12 42,9 12 38,7
Koekelberg 9 33,3 8 42,1 9 40,9 9 37,5
Molenbeek-Saint-Jean 11 24,4 8 25,8 8 22,2 10 25,0
Saint-Gilles 13 37,1 10 41, 7 11 39,3 12 38,7
Saint-Josse-Ten-Noode 8 27,6 6 30, 0 7 30,4 7 26,9
Schaerbeek 16 34,0 12 36,4 14 36,8 16 38,1
Uccle 20 48,8 14 48,3 16 48,5 18 48,6
Watermael-Boitsfort 10 37,0 7 36,8 8 36,4 10 41, 7
Woluwe-Saint-Lambert 17 45,9 15 57,7 16 53,3 16 48,5
Woluwe-Saint-Pierre 11 33,3 10 43,5 10 38,5 10 33,3
TOTAL 266 38,8 199 41,6 227 41,3 249 40,7
 
3. Smaller colleges of Mayor and aldermen
40 For the colleges of aldermen we have tested the same three scenarios: a reduction by 10,
20 or 30 % of the number of aldermen. We have done so without taking into account the
additional Dutch aldermen (see above) for they are the result of agreements within the
majority. We have also applied the three scenarios linearly in each municipality. Table 12
shows the number of aldermen per municipality and for each of the scenarios.
 
Table 12. Size of the council of aldermen in each of the three scenarios 
Municipality 2012-2018 - 30 % - 20 % - 10 %
Anderlecht 9 6 7 8
Auderghem 7 5 6 6
Berchem-Sainte-Agathe 6 4 5 5
Brussels 9 6 7 8
Etterbeek 7 5 6 6
Evere 7 5 6 6
Forest 8 6 6 7
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Ganshoren 6 4 5 5
Ixelles 8 6 6 7
Jette 7 5 6 6
Koekelberg 6 4 5 5
Molenbeek-Saint-Jean 8 6 6 7
Saint-Gilles 7 5 6 6
Saint-Josse-Ten-Noode 6 4 5 5
Schaerbeek 9 6 7 8
Uccle 8 6 6 7
Watermael-Boitsfort 6 4 5 5
Woluwe-Saint-Lambert 8 6 6 7
Woluwe-Saint-Pierre 7 5 6 6
TOTAL 139 97 111 125
41 The most drastic scenario of 30 % would reduce the number of aldermen in the BCR by
42 units (from 139 to 97). A 20 % linear reduction would reduce the number of aldermen
by 28 and a 10 % reduction would result in a drop of 14 aldermen. In case of a 30 %
reduction, the smallest councils in the BCR would count 4 aldermen, or the number of
aldermen stated in the NLC for municipalities with 5 000 to 9 999 inhabitants. 
42 The  reduction  in  the  number  of  aldermen  leads  to  the  same  considerations  as  the
reduction in the number of councillors. Should the colleges all have an odd number of
aldermen? Should there be a minimum per municipality? Can an upper limit be set for
the whole BCR, after which the fixed number of aldermen for the region is distributed
among the municipalities on the basis of the population? 
43 The question also arises as to how the work will be able to be carried out and distributed
if there are fewer aldermen. The current workload of the aldermen varies greatly from
one municipality to another, and also between the aldermen within the municipalities. It
is  therefore very difficult  to  assess  exactly  what  the impact  would be.  However,  the
frequency of the accumulation of local  mandates and regional,  Federal  and European
mandates  (see  above)  suggests  that  there  is  room to  increase  the  workload  for  the
representatives.
44 The  debates  in  the  Brussels-Capital  Parliament8, together  with  individual  interviews
(2013) and focus groups (2017), have also shown that the local representatives themselves
do not reject a reduction in the number of aldermen’s mandates.  Arguments used to
defend that reduction refer to the financial cost and to the finding that some aldermen’s
portfolios are so light that they cannot justify a full-time day job and corresponding
compensation. Arguments against the reduction refer to the negative atmosphere that
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this would evoke, because the good work delivered by many aldermen would then be
questioned9.
45 As with the reduction in the number of municipal councillors, a reduction in the number
of  aldermen  would  also  have  a  clear  and  negative  impact  on  the  number  of  Dutch
speakers in the colleges. In 2012, there were only five municipalities that had a Dutch
speaking college member, without the application of the mechanism of the additional
aldermen (Berchem-Sainte-Agathe, Brussels-City, Etterbeek, Jette, and Molenbeek-Saint-
Jean). With fewer Dutch speaking elected representatives, the chances of one of them
being able to become an alderman clearly decrease. There is a risk that the access for
Dutch speakers to the college of aldermen will only be done through the mechanism of
the additional aldermen, and in a smaller number – a small dozen – of municipalities than
is currently the case. Since a decrease in the number of municipal councillors may also
result in the fact that there are few or no Dutch speaking elected representatives in
different municipalities, there is of course an impact on the possible participation in the
majority and thus on the composition of the colleges of aldermen. 
46 For the gender balances too, a reduction in the colleges of aldermen could have a strong
and  negative  impact.  With  seven  municipalities  that  have  only  one  or  two  female
aldermen, a reduction in the number of aldermen could work against them. 
 
Conclusions
47 Today,  the  Brussels-Capital  Region  has  685 municipal  councillors  and  139 aldermen
(without counting the additional aldermen). This high number is a simple consequence of
the application of the rules of the New Municipal Law which are also used in Flanders and
in Wallonia for setting the number of local  representatives.  As the nineteen Brussels
municipalities are all relatively large, the total number of representatives is therefore
high.  In  Flanders  and  in  Wallonia,  on  the  other  hand,  there  are  many  smaller
municipalities, which means that there is a higher number of municipal councillors per
1 000 inhabitants than in Brussels. In Brussels, this ratio is 0,6, in Flanders 1,15 and in
Wallonia  1,45.  If  we  look at  the  number  of  councillors  per  square  kilometre,  this  is
obviously larger in Brussels than in Wallonia and Flanders. Brussels has 4,8 councillors
per square kilometre, Wallonia 0,31 and Flanders 0,5510.
48 This relatively high number of representatives – even when compared to other (capital)
cities –  often  leads  to  suggestions  to  reduce  the  number  of  positions.  The  Brussels
Minister-President Vervoort too, has already said several times that he wants to move in
that  direction.  An  ordinance  dated  25 January  2018  stipulates  that  the  number  of
aldermen in 2018 will remain the same as in 2012. That is not a reduction, but the non-
implementation of a possible increase in the number of aldermen. 
49 In this contribution, we examined the impact of a possible reduction in the number of
councillors and aldermen. We analysed three scenarios: a reduction of 10, 20 and 30 %. We
can conclude that  a  decrease in the number of  local  representatives would not  be a
politically neutral process. First of all, we note that the impact on the smaller groups in
the municipal  councils  would be  very  high.  Those  would become even smaller,  thus
distributing the workload over a smaller number of councillors. In addition, it is also very
clear that the decline in the number of municipal councillors would especially affect the
Dutch speaking elected representatives. Their number would drop in all scenarios, and in
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some municipalities would even be reduced to one or zero.  There are only a limited
number of lists that would disappear from the municipal councils in the case of a decline
in  the  number  of  councillors,  but  these  are  almost  all  Dutch  speaking  lists,  and  in
particular the unilingual Dutch speaking lists. The Dutch speakers would also be affected
by the composition of smaller colleges of aldermen. In municipalities with only one Dutch
speaking  elected  representative,  the  probability  of  being  included  in  the  college  of
aldermen  is  less  likely,  and  where  there  are  no  more  Dutch  speaking  elected
representatives, the mechanism of the additional alderman can no longer be used. 
50 There would not be any impact of  the drop in the number of  councillors on gender
balances. But for the colleges of aldermen we do expect visible consequences. Women are
already strongly under-represented in the colleges – seven municipalities have only one
or  two female  aldermen –  and they would have even less  chance to  be  appointed in
smaller colleges. 
51 A reduction of  the  number  of  local  representatives  in  the  Brussels-Capital  Region is
certainly legally possible. However, its political impact is not negligible. In the debates
that will certainly continue to follow on the status of the municipalities, their number,
their relationship to the regional level and the necessary or unnecessary complexity of
the  institutions,  the  knowledge  that  a  relatively  simple  change  such  as  the  linear
reduction of the number of councillors or aldermen can have serious consequences, is a
very relevant insight.
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NOTES
1. http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?
language=fr&la=F&cn=1988062435&table_name=loi 
2. Projections are extrapolations of existing developments, but should always be viewed with
caution, especially as they (try to) look further into the future.
3. A January 2018 ordinance limits the number of  aldermen for 2018 to the 2012 number of
aldermen. 
4. The D'Hondt system divides the results per party by 1, 2, 3, 4, and so on, and then allocate the
seats in order of the quotients of these divisions. The Imperiali system divides them by 2, 3, 4,
and  so  on.  That  small  difference  between  the  two  electoral  systems  does  have  important
consequences.  The  D'Hondt  system  provides  very  proportional  results,  with  only  a  small
advantage  for  the  bigger  parties.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Imperiali  system  offers  a  less
proportional result. Especially when there is one major party and a lot of smaller parties, the
Imperiali divisors make it much easier for this major party to gain an additional seat than it does
for  the  smaller  ones.  Applying  the  D'Hondt  system  on  the  municipal  level  can  lower  the
threshold for the smaller parties, and thus can have a less dramatic impact in case of a reduction
in the number of available seats.
5. We first had semi-structured interviews with 22 municipal councillors in 2013. We added three
collective discussions in 2017, each with seven or eight councillors from the opposition. We
selected them in order to have the best possible representativeness in terms of municipality,
seniority, age and party political background.
6. The cumulation of mandates is not a marginal phenomenon in Brussels politics [e.g. Vaesen,
2006]. More than two-thirds of the members of the Parliament of the Brussels-Capital Region
cumulate that mandate with a local position. Limiting the accumulation would initially increase
the number of representatives but that increase would immediately be absorbed by a 10 % drop
in the number of available mandates.
7. We have identified them on the basis of two criteria. On the one hand, there are the
elected  representatives  on  unilingual  Dutch  lists  (N-VA,  Vlaams  Belang,  SAMEN  in
Auderghem).  On the other hand,  it  involves elected representatives on bilingual  lists
(Ecolo-Groen, Mayor's List, PS-SP.a, CDH-CD & V, MR-VLD) which have made a declaration
of language affiliation and who later were candidates on a list of Dutch speakers at the
elections on the regional, federal and European level or that we found on the site of a
Dutch speaking party. For some, it was not easy to determine the language group. We
have then searched their personal profile or we relied on media coverage.
8. Proposal of ordinance to abolish an alderman's position in each municipality and to
include the CPAS-President in the council, Doc, Parl. Rég. Brux.-Cap., session 2011-2012,
A-257/1, 23 December 2011
9. Proposal of ordinance to abolish to abolish an alderman's position in each municipality
and to include the CPAS-President in the council, reported on behalf of the Committee on
Internal Affairs, in charge of the local authorities and the agglomeration authorities, Doc,
Parl. Rég. Brux.-Cap., session 2012-2013, A-257/2, 18 April 2013
10. More details and international comparisons can be found in van Haute, Deschouwer
et.al. 2018 
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ABSTRACTS
The number of municipal councillors and aldermen in the Brussels-Capital Region is relatively
high, and increases at each election. In the debates on the functioning of the political institutions
of the Region the idea to reduce the number of local representatives is regularly raised. This
contribution  explores  the  possible  implications  of  such  a  reduction.  Three  scenarios  are
examined:  a  reduction  by  10 %,  by  20 %  and  by  30 %.  For  each  of  these  scenarios,  the
consequences  for  the  ideological  diversity  in  the  municipal  councils,  the  workload  for  the
representatives  and  the  aldermen,  the  formation  of  coalitions,  the  gender  balances  and  the
position of the Dutch speaking elected representatives are simulated. For the smaller groups, the
Dutch speaking representatives and the gender balances the effects are clearly negative.
Le  nombre de conseillers  communaux et  d’échevins  dans la  Région de Bruxelles-Capitale  est
relativement élevé et augmente à chaque élection. Au cours des débats sur le fonctionnement des
institutions  politiques  de  la  Région,  l’idée  de  réduire  le  nombre  de  mandataires  locaux  est
régulièrement mise sur la table. La présente contribution étudie les implications possibles d’une
telle diminution. Trois scénarios sont envisagés :  une diminution de 10 %, de 20 % et de 30 %.
Pour chacun de ces scénarios, une simulation a été faite de ses effets sur le pluralisme dans les
conseils communaux, sur la charge de travail des conseillers et échevins, sur la formation de
coalitions, sur les équilibres de genres et sur la position des élus néerlandophones. Pour les petits
groupes,  pour les néerlandophones et pour l’égalité des genres,  les effets seraient clairement
négatifs.
Het aantal gemeenteraadsleden en schepenen in het Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest is relatief
hoog,  en  stijgt  bij  elke  verkiezing.  In  de  debatten  over  het  functioneren  van  de  politieke
instellingen  van  het  Gewest  wordt  regelmatig  het  idee  geopperd  om  het  aantal  lokale
mandatarissen te verminderen. Deze bijdrage onderzoekt welke de mogelijke implicaties van een
dergelijke vermindering zouden zijn.  Drie  scenario’s  worden bekeken:  een vermindering met
10 %, met 20 % en met 30 %. Voor elk van die scenario’s wordt gesimuleerd welke de gevolgen
zijn voor de ideologische diversiteit in de gemeenteraden, de werklast voor de raadsleden en
schepenen,  de  coalitievorming,  de  genderevenwichten en de  positie  van de  Nederlandstalige
verkozenen.  Voor  kleine  fracties,  voor  de  Nederlandstaligen  en  voor  de  genderevenwichten
zouden de effecten duidelijk negatief zijn. 
INDEX
Mots-clés: communes, élections, fédéralisme, institutions, personnel politique, région, système
électoral
Trefwoorden federalisme, gemeenten, gewest, instellingen, kiesstelsel, politiek personeel,
verkiezingen
Keywords: elections, electoral system, federalism, institutions, municipalities, political staff,
region
Subjects: 2. statut de Bruxelles – fonctionnement institutionnel – vie politique
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